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ARTICLE
Authority as epistemic capital
Pertti Alasuutari
Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Tampere, Tampere, Finland
ABSTRACT
The article proposes that authority denotes an actor’s appeals or
other references to objects or facts that she expects others to respect
or fear. The paper identiﬁes four types of authority: capacity-based,
ontological, moral, and charismatic. That is, authority can be built on
the assumption that an actor is capable of accomplishing things; on
expertise or respected accounts of reality; on deference to principles;
and on extraordinary awe attached to an organization or individual.
Such authority can be called epistemic capital. Those who are more
successful in piling up epistemic capital behind their projects have
more inﬂuence on others’ conduct.
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1. Introduction
A standard starting point for theorization of power is to consider a real or imagined
community, society or organization and to ask who has power in it and on what
grounds. Weber’s classical treatment of power and authority in a society or organization
is a prime example. The community power debate, which has set the coordinates for
generations of theorists (Clegg 1976, Dowding 2011), is another case in point. In it,
‘elitists’ argued that the communities studied had a ruling elite, whereas ‘pluralists’
stressed that several ‘cliques’ had inﬂuence in diﬀerent issue areas. Yet both sides of the
debate shared the vantage point that power denotes a hierarchical feature of a com-
munity: a pyramid or a multi-peak proﬁle. Discussants also pointed out that power has
diﬀerent ‘faces,’ for instance that those exercising power can do it by acting on people’s
consciousness of their real interests (Lukes 2005), but the focus of mainstream theori-
zation has remained in considering power as a hierarchical feature of a community or
society.1
Taking into account the role of language in the social world poses a challenge to this
framing of power relations. As Potter and Wetherell put it when characterizing the
points made in discursive research: ‘Social texts do not merely reﬂect or mirror objects,
events and categories pre-existing in the social and natural world. Rather, they actively
construct a version of those things. They do not just describe things; they do things. And
being active, they have social and political implications’ (1987, p. 6). The challenge is to
deﬁne the object of study in a way that does not involve the analyst in the very strategies
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of dominance and inﬂuence that one is supposed to reveal. The mainstream approach is
problematic in this respect.
From this perspective it is, for instance, questionable to consider the existence of a
hierarchy of power as a starting point, because it hides from view the performative aspect of
power – that is, the fact that presenting and describing an actor as powerful is part of the
strategies by which authority is constructed. Kings and emperors have always built
impressive palaces and made sure that people who face rulers are physically placed in a
position that makes them feel inferior to the rulers. Similarly, in work organizations, task
descriptions and classiﬁcations of job titles contribute to legitimating income diﬀerences,
for instance gender inequality. Hence men who have the same level of education but a
bigger salary have terms such as ‘higher,’ ‘principal’ or ‘director’ in their title and job
description, regardless of actual chains of command (Kinnunen 2001).
Talking about power relations in a society or organization is also tricky in that it
carries with it the assumption of a community as an independent social system that
deﬁnes each actor’s position in it. I do not mean to argue that theorists have not
referred to the outside world. In the community power debate, for instance, participants
talked about ‘corporate lawyers,’ ‘businesspeople,’ and ‘capitalists’ as key players in the
local power game. However, the idea of power as a hierarchical system within a
community ignores the fact that talking about such actor roles and identities refers to
concepts and beliefs of the surrounding social world, and that actors’ authority depends
and leans on those notions. For instance, lawyers build their inﬂuence on their expertise
in, say, how to apply nationally and globally acknowledged legal principles to an
individual case.
Furthermore, the standard vantage point of denoting power as a hierarchical aspect
of a community leads to treating power relations as ﬁxed and settled. The presumption
that there are roles such as authorities and subalterns in a community easily overlooks
constant contestation of the actors’ attempts and claims of dominance, as well as
strategies of resistance, non-compliance and opposition, which, as Coleman stresses,
are ‘built into any system of legitimate authority’ (Coleman 1997, p. 40). As shown in
the vast scholarship on discourse theory (Torﬁng 1999, van Dijk 1993, e.g. Fairclough
1993, 2003, Wetherell et al. 2001), these actors claim, appeal to, and challenge authority
through using discourses that construct versions of reality and the situation at hand.
The challenge is to develop a theory of power and authority that accounts for these
discursive strategies.
As a solution to these problems in mainstream approaches to power, rather than
presupposing a community with a power structure, I suggest we focus on identifying the
strategies by which actors aim to inﬂuence others’ conduct and thus advance their own
goals. From a societal perspective, these strategies have been characterized as diﬀerent
techniques and forms of knowledge that seek to shape people’s conduct by acting upon
their aspirations, interests and beliefs (Dean 1999, p. 11, Foucault 1991, Inda 2005). Such
epistemic work focuses on three aspects of the social world: people’s understandings of the
ontology of the environment, their identiﬁcations, and their conceptions of what is good or
desirable (Alasuutari andQadir 2014, 2016). Constructing and utilizing authoritative actors
or things is one way of doing it, and this article aims to form a typology of diﬀerent forms of
authority. Hence, the theory of power and authority built here resembles Weber’s classic
treatment in that he, too, talked about diﬀerent types of authority.
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The diﬀerences between Weber’s theory and the one presented here, however, are
signiﬁcant. For one thing, in the Weberian tradition, authority is distinguished from
power, which denotes an actor’s ability to carry out his or her will despite resistance,
whatever the means, whereas authority signiﬁes legitimate domination: the ability of a
person within an organization to give commands which others are likely to obey
(Weber 1978, p. 53). Here, instead, power is treated as a concept that refers to the
fact that people aspire to rule and control others, whereas authority denotes a means
with which it is done: in the attempt to aﬀect others’ conduct, an actor appeals or
otherwise calls attention to persons, organizations or things that she expects others to
respect or fear. Thus, here authority signiﬁes anything that actors use to aﬀect others; it
denotes the recognition among the actors of someone or something being worth taking
into account when considering one’s own conduct. That is, actors may present them-
selves as powerful or claim authority for themselves, but they may as well make use of
authorities and authoritative principles, thus struggling for a hegemonic conception of
the situation that signiﬁcantly aﬀects others’ views and behavior. This does not mean
that we only talk about subtle means of persuasion by which to get others’ consent; in
these games of power people can also resort to threats and acts of violence and other
means of coercion to get their message through. To use a well-known expression, actors
can make an oﬀer that others can’t refuse. This means that authorities are not
necessarily liked or admired; rulers can be authoritarian and authoritative facts about
the environment can be unpleasant.
The theory of authority advocated here stresses that authority is always relational
(Emirbayer 1997, Selg 2016a, 2016b): someone or something is authoritative only if
people recognize its authority and treat it as such by, for instance, referring to it as a
fact when proposing or deciding how to act. Similarly, Foucault’s view of power has
been interpreted to mean that power is an ‘internal relation,’ similar to that between
husband and wife (Kusch 1991). In such a relationship, each actor could not be thought
of without the other ones; the whole constitutes the parts that comprise it. This does not
mean that all actors in a network of power relations are equally powerful, but it does
mean that power also sets conditions on and aﬀects the identities of those who hold
power, and that dominance is dependent on actors’ conceptions of themselves and of
the whole state of aﬀairs. Related to that, Foucault also stressed that people’s concep-
tions of power are an essential element of the strategies through which we are governed
and, as an instance of this, the prevalent notion of power as only comprising a
hierarchical chain of command helps to hide from sight subtle strategies through
which power also works (1980, p. 85–86).2
In aﬀecting others’ understanding and behavior, actors use various strategies,
although it is important to stress that the term strategy does not necessarily denote
conscious calculation; actors’ strategies are often intuitive, and their rationality is
culture-bound. As discussed in the example above, one strategy is to create and utilize
the assumption that an actor is capable of accomplishing things, such as using incen-
tives, punishments, or physical force. This can be called capacity-based authority.
Another strategy is to construct or appeal to renowned actors and their accounts of
reality, for instance to expert knowledge. This can be called ontological authority. The
third strategy is to employ prevalent conceptions of important persons, organizations,
texts or principles that allegedly deﬁne individual rights and duties. For instance, the
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL POWER 167
law and local regulations deﬁne individuals’ positions within an organization. Let us call
this moral authority. Finally, actors may create or utilize extraordinary awe attached to
an organization or individual, for instance a famous political or religious leader. This
can be called charismatic authority.
Rather than a hierarchical position that allows one to give commands (Weber 1978),
we should think of this kind of authority as cumulative: how much bearing actors have
on others’ conduct varies from marginal to substantial. By building, utilizing and
combining diﬀerent types of authority, actors aim to accumulate their inﬂuence on
others. In that sense, authority can be called epistemic capital: it is an accumulation of
diﬀerent kinds of ‘assets’ by which actors ascertain the social world and the situation at
hand. When discussing actors’ attempts to inﬂuence others’ conduct, I talk about
epistemic capital because it functions through knowledge and its validation. Those
who are more successful in piling up epistemic capital behind their projects have
more inﬂuence on others’ conduct.
This approach is close to Parsons’ (1963a, 1963b) theory of power as a circulating
medium, analogous to money. Some other theorists have also likened the foundations
of social order to money. Perhaps the most well-known scholar is Bourdieu, whose
theorization of the social world builds on identifying diﬀerent forms of capital. He, for
instance, talks about symbolic capital (Bourdieu and Nice 1977, Bourdieu 1989).
Similarly, Putnam and others (1993, 2000) talk about social capital, the amount of
which is a key feature of a community.
In their persuasion work, actors are eclectic in accumulating epistemic capital behind
their projects: they may use all forms of inﬂuence from intimidation and incentives to
referencing moral principles to inﬂuence others’ conduct. But regardless of individual
diﬀerences, all these strategies work upon others’ understanding of the world and of the
situation at hand. Hence, governance operates through epistemic work in that actors
work upon knowledge (in a broad sense of the concept) and its validation. This work
focuses on three aspects: what are the facts; what is possible and what not; and what is
acceptable or desirable (Alasuutari and Qadir 2014). Besides, how seriously actors are
taken depends on how powerful they are believed to be, which is why appealing to
emotions, impression management and utilization of prevalent notions of power are an
important part of the game.
My proposal to approach power from the perspective of persuasive force does not
mean that we need to discard considerations of hierarchical relations in organizations,
for instance those between political leaders and citizens. From such a perspective, to cite
Reed (2017), we can indeed conceive of power as the ability ‘to be able to send someone
to act on your behalf [. . .] and to bind that person to pursue your project.’ However,
this view of power does not elaborate on the strategies by which actors aim to increase
their persuasive force and hence help to explain situations in which all parties aﬀect
others’ choices, moves and positions. Such a state of aﬀairs is particularly characteristic
of networks, ‘ﬂat’ organizations, and governance based on incentives that aim to move a
majority of people in a preferred direction, without anyone giving orders or sending
others on their behalf. To capture power games in conﬂictual situations, we need a
broader conception and new vocabulary of power and authority as epistemic capital.
In what follows, I will discuss the shortcomings of the hierarchical view of power,
and how the theory developed here overcomes them. Then, I will unpack the four types
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of authority mentioned above. By way of conclusion, I discuss the implications of this
theory of authority.
2. The limits of the hierarchical view of power
The mainstream theorization and scholarship on power is dominated by views that deal
with power and authority as a social hierarchy within a community or social organization.
For example, the community power debate, which set the scene for all central issues that
continue to be discussed and debated in mainstream analyses of power (Dowding 2011),
focused entirely on disagreements on the features and bases of the power structure in a
community or society. From Hunter’s (1953) and Mills’ (1956) community studies to
Lukes’ (2005) inﬂuential synthesis, all the way to commentaries on his theory on the
three faces of power, the participants in this lengthy discussion conceive of power as an
aspect of an organization or society. Arendt puts this conviction succinctly by noting that
power is inherent in the very existence of political communities; it ‘springs up whenever
people get together and act in concert’ (1970, p. 52). This starting point means that the
existence of a ‘pecking order,’ with some individuals having power over others, is taken for
granted. Consequently, the question of power becomes a question of who has power in a
community and what are its bases. Struggle and strife for dominance and inﬂuence tends to
be ruled outside the discussion; it is assumed that the battle has been settled. The actors who
are outside such a power structure or chain of command are ignored, or their ﬁght for
supremacy is not discussed in terms of power.
Reed’s (2017) theory of power appears to diﬀer from the mainstream view in that he
also mentions those who are outside a hierarchy of power. According to him, power
relations comprise three kinds of agents: rectors, who recruit and control allies to
pursue their project, actors, who take up rector’s project, and others, who are either
objects, enemies, or ignorant outsiders. Yet Reed’s fascinating terminology is similar to
other theories in that, for him also, power depicts chains that involve rectors and actors.
In all, except for some critical voices against the hierarchical view (see Coleman 1997),
theories of power and authority tend to take a hierarchy for granted. The self-evident focus
is on power as something that wins individuals’ resistance and gets them to do something
they would not otherwise do (Dahl 1957, p. 202–203) and on domination as ‘the probability
that a command with a given speciﬁc content will be obeyed by a given group of persons’
(Weber 1978, p. 53). These and similar deﬁnitions of power and authority do not exclude
struggle and resistance, but they emphasize a hierarchy in that they assume that a person or
a power elite has ‘gained the upper hand’ in one or several issue areas, which is considered
as a criterion for power.
Stemming from Weber, this tradition of talking about power as a hierarchy makes
sense when one wants to explain the basic structures of territorial states. According to
Weber’s story line, empires are built on military force used to conquer a territory and
subjugate its population under its rule. But, this story goes, soon social order in that
territory is secured also by rules, the observation of which is expected of the population
and monitored by the administrative staﬀ. Hence, state formation comprises a mono-
poly of violence complemented with rules that draw their legitimation from tradition,
rationality, or charismatic leadership. A key feature of the state is that it is a compulsory
organization with a territorial basis:
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It possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, to which the
organized activities of the administrative staﬀ, which are also controlled by regulations, are
oriented. This system of order claims binding authority, not only over the members of the
state, the citizens, most of whom have obtained membership by birth, but also to a very
large extent over all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction. (Weber 1978, p. 56)
According to Weber’s theory, the state’s domination over the population rests on actual
use or threat of force, and on the state’s claim to monopolize legitimate coercion by
violence. Thus, to use Weber’s (1978, p. 56) example, the right of a father to discipline
his children is considered legitimate only if permitted by the state in legislation.
This view of power and authority works well in legalistic and bureaucratic contexts.
The conceptual system presumes a polity, e.g. a nation-state, as a social organization
separate from other polities, making it diﬃcult to account for cross-border inﬂuences
and interdependencies. The methodological statism (Chernilo 2006, 2008) characteristic
of such theorization of power is evident also in the fact that, again following Weber,
authority is routinely deﬁned as somehow legitimated domination. The link to judicial
vocabulary is so tight that the word which refers to a legal basis is used as a generic term
for acceptance or consent. Similarly, Weber chose to depict legitimate domination as
authority – a word that is also used as a synonym for governmental oﬃcials and
agencies. In this way, our whole vocabulary of power is impregnated by imageries of
public administration relying on laws and chains of command.
The focus on formal hierarchies ﬁts poorly into instances in which there are no
predeﬁned relations of dominance; where, instead, several actors struggle for their impor-
tance and inﬂuence. Since the vocabulary leads us to thinking that the struggle is over and
relations of dominance are settled, attention is drawn away from the ‘micro-physics’
(Foucault 1977) and ‘capillaries’ (Foucault 2003) of power: the ways in which many persons
make moves and lay claims that aﬀect the conditions of the actors involved. Such competi-
tion between the actors is not only a starting point for a later status quo but, rather, the
expected state of aﬀairs in a well-functioning liberal economy where, it is assumed, the
fundaments of social order are determined by the ‘invisible hand’ of the market. Consider
organizational arrangements by which the state’s bureaucratic norm steering has been
replaced by privatization, market steering and performance-based pay, so that actors are
expected to become enterprising subjects (Rose 1992, 1999). In these circumstances
governance is based on deﬁning and negotiating the rules of the game, not giving orders
to the players. As to the competitors, some are always more successful than others but there
are no chains of command, and assumptions about dominance or leadership are constantly
contested. When all actors, even within the same organization, are ‘enterprising selves’
whose pay or proﬁt depends on their performance, the organization is ‘ﬂat.’
The same ﬂatness is evident when we look at power and governance from a global
perspective. Many authoritative sources or entities appealed to in national political
contexts are in fact international bodies such as intergovernmental organizations
(IGOs) and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), whose inﬂuence
is based on their respect, not their ability to give orders (Alasuutari 2016). They are
outside the organizational structures of national states. As to world society, it is
essentially stateless; it has an ‘almost feudal character of parcelized legal-rational
sovereignty’, as Meyer and others (1997, p. 145) put it. Yet nation-states are surprisingly
similar in many dimensions and change in similar ways, but that is because they adopt
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similar policies voluntarily, not because of a world government or other hierarchical
institutional order. Advances in global governance, for instance in environmental
protection, are primarily based on the creation of global ‘epistemic communities’
(Haas 1992a, 1992b, Miller and Fox 2001) that inﬂuence public opinion and policy-
makers. The inﬂuence of the global organizations and networks involved depends on
their respect and credibility, but the global system does not form a chain of command
in which an actor or body has formal authority to give orders.3
Actors in ﬂat organizations or networks do have authority in that their views and
recommendations are respected, but such a meaning for the word authority is diﬀerent
from authority depicting a person who has legitimate right to give orders that are
obeyed (Weber 1978, p. 53). Therefore, to better capture such strategies of power, we
need to adopt the broader meaning of authority that captures very well the key role of
language and signiﬁcation in the social world and its power games, pointed out in
discourse theories. From the discursive perspective, power is essentially the struggle for
persuasion, which is in turn based on the utilization of actors, facts or principles that
others take seriously.
3. Authority as persuasion power
Weber’s classical typology of authority deals with diﬀerent grounds for someone’s
ability to give orders that are obeyed. But dictionaries also give authority other mean-
ings. In addition to being an attribute of a superior position, authority is commonly
used to describe the conﬁdent quality of someone who knows a lot about something or
who is respected or obeyed by other people. Thus, an expert or an authoritative text,
such as a law or a holy text, can be called an authority. If we combine these two
meanings, we can broaden the meaning of authority to depict the inﬂuence or persua-
sion power that an actor or text has in that others take it seriously into consideration
when deciding about their views or behavior.
Generally acknowledged authorities have diﬀering groundings, but those bases are
often enmeshed into a generic epistemic capital usable in aﬀecting others’ conduct. In
addition to the idea that actors can accumulate it, authority is analogous to capital in
that, like money, one can invest in and lend authority. For instance, individuals invest
in a politician by trusting in and supporting her, and she can use those investments in
advancing political goals. Similarly, individuals ‘lend their names’ to political parties or
associations, which appear as ‘inﬂuence banks’ (Parsons 1963a, p. 61), which can, in
turn, reinvest that authority to promote goals that all their supporters would not
necessarily approve of (Coleman 1963). Secondly, like capital, authority is a social
relationship, and as such it is based on others’ trust: a person or organization is
inﬂuential insofar as they are considered authoritative by others. This also means that
the masses of people believed to support an organization or, say, an army’s ability to
carry out a military strike, can be imaginary; what counts is the actor’s credibility
(although fooling others is seldom easy).
It is also important to stress that authority as epistemic capital is used not only by the
allegedly powerful ‘inﬂuence banks.’ Like money, epistemic capital is in constant
circulation. Actors who aim to work on the comportment of others lend others’
authority by referring to them: by presenting a framing of reality that utilizes
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authoritative views and actors. Besides, authority is not only a property of actors:
generally respected principles are also authorities that actors employ. But whether
actors present themselves as powerful or allude to perceived authorities and author-
itative principles, they struggle to impose their vision of the social world on others,
hence aﬀecting their understanding and behavior.
From this perspective, we can identify diﬀerent types of reasons why someone or
something is respected or feared. The reasons for such deference may range from
physical strength to expertise and to a source’s divine origins, but in the last instance
the crucial factor is how others perceive the object of respect. In other words, authority
must be considered as built on belief and trust, which can be used to manipulate others’
conception of the situation at hand. This does not mean that we deny the impact of
factors such as wealth and other material resources on an actor’s ability to control and
inﬂuence others’ behavior. It only means that we must not use any features or proper-
ties as self-evident explanations for individuals’ moves and social processes. In that way,
we would miss an important aspect of governance: speakers construct and appeal to
facts, principles or entities that they assume others consider as unavoidable determina-
tions of the situation, or they cite sources believed to give credence to the claims and
proposals made. Since the construction and employment of authority to strengthen a
speaker’s truth claims, rationales, propositions or commands are a means to inﬂuence
others’ moves, manipulation and deception are a potential part of the game.
Thismeans that whenwe try to understand and explain the ways inwhich actors attempt
to inﬂuence others’ conduct, we need to analyze the way they use common understandings
of how such inﬂuence occurs. The concept of authority is a case in point. Rather than
originating in social science, it is a tacit concept people use to refer to persons or entities
considered inﬂuential one way or another. This entails that – to use terms introduced in
ethnomethodology (ten Have, 2004, p. 34–38, Zimmerman and Pollner 1971) – authority
must be viewed both as a resource, i.e. as an analytical concept we use as sociologists, and as
a topic that is itself in need of sociological scrutiny. As a concept commonly used in
discussing power and inﬂuence in society, authority is an example of what Don
Zimmerman (quoted in ten Have 2004, p. 34) calls ‘idealizations’. They are a feature of
social life, not only as a natural part of scientiﬁc theorizing but also in the form of common-
sense typiﬁcations.
When approaching authority as a topic of social life, we could say that we adopt a
nominalist view of power (Foucault 1980, p. 93, Alasuutari 2010): authority is a term by
which people refer to important and inﬂuential persons, organizations, sources and
other entities. People use the notion of authority as a referent that lumps together
diﬀerent means by and occurrences in which such inﬂuence takes place. In addition,
actors use common conceptions of authority strategically as means to inﬂuence others’
views and conduct.
One feature of the common concept of authority appears to be that we presuppose
an organizational hierarchy in which authority comprises power possessed by those
residing ‘high up’ in society, able to dictate what those placed lower can or must do.
Consequently, actors utilize the assumption of hierarchy as one of the cultural imageries
of the social world (Alasuutari and Qadir 2016). For instance, actors who want to
inﬂuence national policies often attempt to create and utilize the impression that
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international governmental organizations such as the UNICEF have sanctioning power
over government policies (Alasuutari et al. 2016).
Naturally, the tacit assumption that authority is based on a hierarchical position is
not the only way in which actors aim to create and utilize respect for someone or
something. Authority is also commonly associated with a source or entity that repre-
sents moral high ground, undisputed knowledge and expertise, the views of the
majority, or strength by which to combat clashing interests. Persons aiming to create
respect for an actor also utilize these images of authority. In addition, authority is
typically associated with an entity bigger and more permanent than a single individual.
This element of the tacit concept of authority is also utilized by people who want to
inﬂuence others. In world society theory, this has been given special emphasis by saying
that in modern society, actorhood has an agentic aspect: individuals act as agents for
imagined general principles, often embodied in entities such as organizations and
nation-states (Meyer and Jepperson 2000, Meyer 2010). Existing world society theory
scholarship has stressed the consequence this has for global isomorphism: rationales of
conduct become codiﬁed, standardized and naturalized, which means that they make
individuals’ behavior more uniform and predictable, and general moral principles also
diﬀuse more easily. But this also has implications for strategies by which actors try to
inﬂuence others’ opinions and choices: it is useful to establish and act as an agent for a
collective actor, such as an NGO, which claims to represent a large body of members
and a set of ideals and principles. Hence actors typically claim authority for, and in the
name of, an organization.
Since authority draws on beliefs about the features of authoritative entities, to inﬂuence
public opinion and policymaking, actors pay attention to imagemanagement and branding
(Blood 2004, Vestergaard 2008, Kylander and Stone 2012, Schwenger et al. 2014), which
does not necessarily mean a conscious strategy. Such branding of organizations can take
many forms. Typically, NGOs want to be perceived as professionally managed, inﬂuential
formal organizations that are oﬃcial guardians of a good cause or representatives of a civil
society group. For instance, Hilhorst (2003, p. 7) says that nongovernmental organizations
engaged in development aid or charity have a ‘claim-bearing label’ based on their good
purposes, which enables them to make a bid to access funding and public representation.4
Of course, this does not mean that there is no foundation for authority. It is not
feasible to create a credible brand of an organization without suﬃcient resources. For
instance, to become known and respected as a knowledge-producing think tank one
needs to create a track record of respectable research reports. Similarly, arranging a
demonstration requires people in the street. But the public attention that an organiza-
tion or event gets, the message that gets across to others and their perception, is what
counts in the last instance. Authority is relational, and therefore dependent on others’
recognition.
As stated, there are diﬀerent reasons why actors or other components of the social
world are considered authoritative and hence respected or feared. In the subsequent
sections, I will discuss the four types of authority.
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4. Capacity-based authority
The theory of power and authority developed here diﬀers from Arendt’s (1970) and
Foucault’s (1982, p. 220) views, according to which violence falls beyond the strategies
of power. I propose, instead, that threat and acts of violence are one source of authority:
they contribute to making an actor worth taking account of when others are consider-
ing their moves. To use the term coined by Avant and others (2010, p. 13–14), such
capacity-based authority can also be based on other capabilities, such as wealth; for
instance, banks who can decide about loans and investments have such authority.
The reason why Arendt (1970) counts violence outside the sphere of power is that –
according to her – power is a property of a community. Therefore, according to this
line of thought, violence destroys the legitimacy of power, which is why ‘power and
violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent’ (1970: 56).
Albeit understandable in its own context, the way such a view is blind to strategic
uses of violence in innumerable contexts also illustrates the limitations of the hierarch-
ical view of power. It is certainly true that violence is a risky last resort not only because
it may weaken the eﬀect of strategies that appeal to the subjects’ loyalty. An aggressor
may also be defeated by the resistance that violence raises, in which case their authority
based on fear of their strength is lost. In that sense, an act of violence, for instance a
war, is like a reset button: the outcome is used as an indicator that shows which is the
most powerful military might, and hence it aﬀects the future pecking order.5 Yet acts of
violence are just one strategy within relations and strategies of power. Violence can be
used in several ways. It can be a strategy by which an actor coerces the victims to act in
a desired way. Terror, instead, is a message sent toward the rest of the target population,
meant to inﬂuence its behavior. An army’s military operation abroad may serve a
function in the domestic political ﬁeld: it is a sign of strength and a means to direct
public attention away from domestic problems. Military groups’ capacity for warfare,
nuclear weapons in particular, is normally used as a deterrent. A military operation can
also be used as a demonstration of what the army is capable of and what will happen if
the actor’s demands are not met.
As is the case with all types of authority, the results of a use or threat of violence are
dependent on others’ reactions. The targets of violence can respond to it in multiple
ways: they can, for instance, choose to surrender to the violators’ demands or try to
resist and ﬁght back. In any case, an actor’s perceived capacity to accomplish violent
acts aﬀects others’ perception of that actor. For good or bad, such an actor is taken
seriously when others ponder their moves. Consider a dictator or a maﬁa boss: they are
authorities in that they are feared and that their views and moves are anticipated and
taken into account by others.
The threat or actual use of violence is just one special case of the use of capacity-
based authority. Avant et al. (2010) use this term to reference authority that derives
from and is justiﬁed by the task the authority is supposed to perform for a community.
Here, however, the concept is used in a broader meaning. When for instance thinking
about another country as a potential aggressor, we cannot say that they are respected
for their perceived capacity to serve the community. Besides, like all types of authority
discussed here, capacity-based authority is not only used by the actor to which it is
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attached; for instance, the ministries of defense use the threat of other countries as
justiﬁcation for their demands to increase military spending.
The inﬂuence of collective actors and happenings such as demonstrations, mass
movements and parties are other examples of capacity-based authority. Political systems
do not formally acknowledge demonstrations as a means to intervene in politics, but
many examples show that a large enough crowd is taken seriously even by autocratic
regimes. Such authority of masses is based on various grounds. A mass demonstration
sends the signal that many people support the demands that the organizers make. It
implies that the regime may not stay in power even at gunpoint, or that ordering the
military to suppress the uprising would lead to bloodshed and possibly a civil war.
Drastic measures against a demonstration also attract international attention and
condemnation. On the other hand, mass movements indicate that their demands will
collect votes in future elections, which is why political leaders take account of them.
Strikes and lockouts are yet another means to accumulate capacity-based authority;
people listen to a group that may endanger their livelihood or prosperity. On the other
hand, capacity-based authority is not necessarily materially grounded. Such authority
also includes the ability to, say, accept or expel members of a community or to decide
about the distribution of religious beneﬁts, such as salvation. Weber (1978, p. 54–56)
refers to the latter as hierocratic coercion, which is a basis for the authority of churches.
When used in the way proposed here, authority diﬀers from the concept’s standard
usage in social theory, wherein authority refers to persons or objects that are respected
and honored within a community. On the other hand, everyday usage of the concept of
authority also recognizes authority based on disapproved means; such cases are referred
to as authoritarian. In that sense, we could say that capacity-based authority can be
either approved (legitimate) or questionable (illegitimate). In any case, the rationales
through which actors aim to inﬂuence the comportment of others by utilizing those
actors’ perceived capacities are recognizable (for instance, the risk of violent confronta-
tion or other means of coercion as a reaction to insubordination is perceived to be real).
5. Ontological authority
When considering debates in the contemporary world, speakers recurrently utilize
respect for a text, person or organization that presents a credible picture of reality as a
means to strengthen their argument. In a similar vein, Avant et al. (2010, p. 12) talk about
expert (or expertise-based) authority, by which they allude to deference based on specia-
lized knowledge. Avant and others, however, deﬁne this kind of authority narrowly as
something that inheres in an actor, whereas I suggest that in practice, actors use
ontological authority more broadly. Speakers may, for instance, refer to science or
scientiﬁc facts to ground their arguments; expert opinion or research reports are refer-
enced to argue what will happen if a decision is taken. To use Scott’s (2014) typology of
the three pillars of institutions, we could say that ontological authority leans on the
cultural-cognitive pillar: on ”the shared conceptions that constitute the nature of social
reality and the frames through which meaning is made” (2014, p. 57). Similarly, Bourdieu
writes that ‘political struggle is a (practical and theoretical) cognitive struggle for the
power to impose the legitimate vision of the social world’ (2000, p. 185) – a struggle in
which some actors and institutions have more deference than others.
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From a realist perspective, counting science, truth and reality as an authority used in
the games of power may sound strange, because one could argue that facts speak for
themselves. But that is precisely why ontological authority is so powerful: appealing to
reality and to what is possible and feasible in the current state of aﬀairs is inﬂuential
because it appears to depoliticize decision-making by making it science-based. And of
course, facts do not speak for themselves: someone needs to deﬁne them and spell out
their implications. Because people have great respect for research-based knowledge,
actors aiming to advance their stakeholder interests or otherwise inﬂuence decision-
making have established a plethora of national and transnational research institutes and
think tanks that lay claim to producing reliable knowledge of reality.
Paradoxically, ontological authority is at its strongest when the authorities or
authoritative sources appear to be impartial regarding politics. From that perspective,
there is no escape for policy experts and scientists from being part of power and
governance: even neutral, innocent attempts to describe social reality and explain it
can construct experts as authorities that are utilized in political argumentation. This
does not mean that we need to give up on trying to honestly reach for the truth rather
than for views that suit us politically, but it means that we must not fail to recognize
scientiﬁc and other interpretations of reality as an object of sociological study. In other
words, the science of society must comprise also science in society. For Emile
Durkheim, this was a central question. Accordingly, his discussion of authority comes
close to what is proposed here, when he stresses that the authority of science can only
rely on ‘opinion’, by which he refers to public opinion and faith in science and
scientists:
Opinion, eminently a social thing, is one source of authority. Indeed, the question arises
whether authority is not the daughter of opinion. Some will object that science is often the
antagonist of opinion, the errors of which it combats and corrects. But science can succeed
in this task only if it has suﬃcient authority, and it can gain such authority only from
opinion itself. All the scientiﬁc demonstrations in the world would have no inﬂuence if a
people had no faith in science. (Durkheim 1995, p. 210)
One corollary of science representing authoritative views of reality is that actors will
attempt to utilize that authority in various ways. Scientists tend to think that this kind
of utilization of science is parasitic, threatening to corrode the authority of science, and
that political uses of concepts, originally stemming from scientiﬁc research, misconstrue
them. But, as Durkheim (1995) stresses, social scientists cannot escape to their own
conceptual system, separate from popular usage of language. In fact, when talking about
social science, typically scholars take concepts from ordinary language, give them a
formal deﬁnition and use them to describe and explain society.
However, ontological authority does not necessarily rely on science and empirical
evidence. Instead, it is part of the authority of religious communities and leaders. As
Weber points out when discussing world religions, oracles are believed to reveal the
truth (1978, p. 430) and priests to have special knowledge that allows them to determine
dogmatic truths (p. 425, 463). As the Thomas’ theorem puts it, ‘if men deﬁne situations
as real, they are real in their consequences’ (Thomas and Thomas 1928, p. 571–572).
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6. Moral authority
Speakers also recurrently defend their views by alluding to commonly accepted princi-
ples or to actors or organizations which are respected for serving those principles or
being knowledgeable about them. The law, judges and legal institutions are an obvious
example; religious rules, priests and the church are a parallel case. Avant and others
name such authority principle-based (2010, p. 13), but we may as well talk about moral
authority, in that actors appeal to norms or standards regarding acceptable or desired
conduct.
This usage of the concept of moral authority diﬀers from Scott (2014), who distin-
guishes between regulative and normative authority. According to him, regulatory
processes involve the capacity to establish rules, inspect others’ conformity to them,
and manipulate sanctions to inﬂuence future behavior, whereas the normative pillar
rests on rules that introduce a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension into
social life. It could be argued, however, that regulative rules, such as laws, are codiﬁca-
tions of moral principles. In that sense, the distinction between regulative and norma-
tive rules is unclear and needless.
It is of course true thatmoral authority is oftenmixedwith other rationales. For instance,
speakers may invoke international treaties because they assume that others consider those
treaties as principles that guide us in the path of morally impeccable conduct. But rules and
treaties can also be considered as hindrances that need to be circumvented to avoid
potential sanctions imposed or other harm caused by the international community. The
same goes for laws: in addition to formulating a commonly accepted practice, a law codiﬁes
a rule, the breaking of which gives legal authorities the capacity to punish the oﬀender. In
that sense, a reference to a principle or a law as a moral authority can be mixed with
capacity-based authority that laws also have.
When talking about morality in general, we can make a distinction between moral
codes and their interpretation. It is not conceivable to think of morality without
generally approved principles, but everyday morality requires judgments. As Walzer
stresses, ‘moral argument is interpretive in character, closely resembling the work of a
lawyer or judge who struggles to ﬁnd meaning in a morass of conﬂicting laws and
precedents’ (Walzer 1987, p. 19). Accordingly, when utilizing moral authority to
convince others of their views, people can allude not only to authoritative principles
but also to authorities regarding their application: they cite an authoritative interpreta-
tion or persons respected for their expertise. For instance, legal experts’ authority rests
especially on their knowledge about how a law has been applied in earlier cases. That is
because most courts follow the doctrine of stare decisis: they are bound by their own
previous decisions in similar cases, especially by previous decisions of higher courts.
Similarly, in many religions the church and its clergy are respected for their expertise or
monopoly in deﬁning the correct way to act to gain salvation or to apply holy texts to
diﬀerent situations. In this instance, Bourdieu talks about religious capital as the
concentration of a corpus of secret knowledge. For instance, in Medieval Europe the
Catholic Church, organized according to a complex ecclesiastical hierarchy, ‘utilized a
language almost unknown to the people and held a monopoly over access to the tools of
worship, sacred texts, and, above all, sacraments’ (Bourdieu 1991, p. 26).
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The moral authority of an interpretation leans not only on an individual who is cited
but on an entire tradition of interpreting laws, moral codes or sacred texts, comprising
numerous court decisions or, say, dogmas promulgated in the Catholic Church’s
magisterium meetings. An expert citing a corpus of knowledge borrows its authority,
and simultaneously the judgment in question becomes part of the corpus. In defending
their case, actors present their proposal as the only logical way to apply moral
principles, but precedent cases and expert opinions always leave latitude for actors to
promote their aspirations; referring to inﬂuential interpretations and texts is only a way
to strengthen one’s case, making it more diﬃcult for others to argue for another
solution.6 The globally surprisingly uniform lawmaking process is a prime example:
at each stage of the legislative process – possibly including background reports, com-
mittee hearings and reports, and sessions in diﬀerent chambers of the parliament –
actors interested in inﬂuencing the outcome engage in accumulating epistemic capital
that contributes to narrowing down the range of what are commonly viewed as ‘realistic
options,’ eventually standardizing any issue into a format where a decision can be made
whether to pass a law (Alasuutari 2016, p. 146).
It is typical of struggles on the right thing to do that the moral nature of the issue is
soon turned into a technical question, for instance disputes about the actual, measur-
able eﬀects of a law or the correct way to interpret sacred texts. In this way, moral
authority gets intermingled with ontological authority: ‘the legitimate vision of the
world,’ as Bourdieu (1989, p. 20) puts it when talking about symbolic power.
7. Charismatic authority
In addition to the three types of authority discussed above, we can distinguish charismatic
authority, which is attached to a person or institution even if there do not seem to be other
grounds for their inﬂuence. According to Weber’s deﬁnition, charisma rests ‘on devotion to
the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the
normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him’ (1978, p. 215). In practice, this
means that a statement or act of a person is considered authoritative because special deference
is attached to the individual or organization in question. Oftentimes it is, however, hard to see
the exemplary character behind charisma in the modern world. Consider celebrities, who
enjoy varying amounts of fame and appreciation (Alexander 2010). They may have special
skills as artists, or they may have become famous for being born to a famous family. Yet they
can inﬂuence public opinion in areas that have nothing to do with their skills or expertise,
which is evidenced in that they may advertise products or promote diﬀerent causes.7
Following Weber, it has been common in previous research and theorization to
make a distinction between personal charisma and oﬃce charisma. As to the former,
it is stressed that the attribution of charisma to a person requires exceptional times
of crises, which is when followers may submit themselves to a desperately needed
leader, believed to be endowed with supernatural or at least speciﬁcally exceptional
powers or qualities (Weber 1978, p. 241, Szelenyi 2016, Reed 2013). According to
Smith (2000), charisma is created by utilizing salvation narratives, the internal
structure of which requires binary oppositions contrasting good and evil. Reed
(2013) extends this discussion by stressing that the construction of charisma requires
charismatic performances: the leader’s public acts and displays create, in followers, a
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deeply aﬀective connection to the leader, associated with his or her individual
characteristics. Oﬃce charisma, on the other hand, denotes the ‘reversal of genuine
charisma into its exact opposite’ (Weber 1978, p. 1139) by associating charisma with
an oﬃce, for instance by establishing the belief that charisma is bound to blood
relationship. But Weber (1978, p. 1139) also noted other instances of oﬃce charisma:
‘The apostolic succession secured through episcopal ordination, the indelible charis-
matic qualiﬁcation acquired through the priest’s ordination, the king’s coronation
and anointment, and innumerable similar practices among primitive and civilized
peoples all derive from this mode of transmission.’ Shils (1965) has extended this
discussion by stressing that there is, in society, a widespread disposition to attribute
charismatic properties to ordinary secular roles, institutions, symbols, and strata or
aggregates of persons. “The ritual surrounding the highest oﬃce, even in republics,
the awe before the place where the ruler sits (as the Presidential Oﬃce in the White
House, or the Kremlin, or the Élysée) testify to the ways in which high ‘secular
authority draws to itself from those who exercise it and from those who are its
objects, the disposition to attribute charisma’ (Shils 1965, p. 205).
Informed by Weber’s historicist narrative of a general disenchantment of the world,
the distinction between personal and oﬃce charisma has stressed the diﬀerence between
the two, and romanticized ‘genuine’ personal charisma as ‘the great revolutionary force’
(Weber 1978, p. 245). Yet, when we scrutinize the discussion on how charisma is
created and how it is attached to persons or organizations, it is obvious that the
methods of creating and enhancing charisma are the same: they consist in constructing
sacredness by utilizing myths and ritual. To create adulation toward a person or
organization, one needs a good story or a whole set of narratives that tell about the
protagonist’s rise to fame, deeds, and ﬁght against evil forces (Smith 2000), but to
anchor the followers’ respect for the hero to emotional experiences, one needs ritual
plays or ‘charismatic performances’ (Reed 2013).
Whether we are talking about the creation of a supposedly new charismatic ﬁgure or
an established organization, actors draw on the same basic story lines. One story line is
to construct the hero as a strong, decisive leader and visionary or as an otherwise
exceptionally talented person; Apple co-founder and former chief executive Steve Jobs
is a good example (Bell and Taylor 2016). On the other hand, pop stars and other
ﬁgures in the entertainment industry are marketed by utilizing the ‘rags to riches’ story:
we learn that, say, Oprah Winfrey ‘was born on the wrong side of the tracks and made
it by willpower, talent and hard work’ (Rojek 2012, p. 132). The same applies to politics;
even though politicians may have a long career in policymaking, they can be branded as
ordinary, ‘inevitably ﬂawed individuals, which gives them an ‘authentic’ quality con-
trasted with distant and aloof politicians’ (Wood et al. 2016, p. 586). Similarly, a good
‘brand narrative’ (Timm Knudsen and Waade 2010, Dean et al. 2015) is crucial for
organizations, for instance nation-states, which are branded as being modern, techno-
logically advanced nations, combined with stories of their heroic past and depictions of
their unique, ‘authentic’ national cultures (Aronczyk 2013, Valaskivi 2016).
These constructions of a person’s or organization’s charisma are made emotionally
touching in public rituals. As Durkheim (1995) described it, the tacit logic of rites is that
participants sanctify sacred persons or things by observing formalized rules in approaching
them.8 The rule-governed modes of behaviour characteristic of rituals play out and
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construct social hierarchies (Bell 1997, p. 138–169, Bloch 1989). Whether we are talking
about a rock concert or a speech by a political or business leader, there is a strict separation
of roles: who can say what, who is in direct contact with the star, and how the audience can
participate. Compared with those of a presidential candidate, the appearances of a pre-
sident-elect are normally more formal and less spectacular, but in all cases the rules
observed in such rituals contribute to creating deference for the main character.
In creating and utilizing charisma through symbolic and ritual means, actors are
eclectic in that they make use of all possible symbols and things that are considered
sacred among the participants. Hence, when the president of the United States takes the
oath of oﬃce, the national ﬂag will be ﬂown, and the president will place his left hand
on the Bible. As Bell (1997, p. 155–159) notes, since rituals aim to convey an air of
sacredness, they often borrow elements that have been sanctiﬁed by older rituals. Actors
also accumulate charisma by borrowing it from other charismatic ﬁgures and emotion-
ally touching, symbolically powerful performances and artefacts. For example, signify-
ing youthfulness, reform and even revolt, campaign songs have become a carefully
picked, important part of U.S. presidential election campaigns, and strategists invite
support from a host of ﬁlm and music stars (Waldman 2003). Sacredness is contagious
(Durkheim 1995), and hence charismatic authority can be amassed.
Utilizing charisma is evident, for instance, when speakers refer to a statement by an
organization’s leader to strengthen their argument. Consider a person holding the
position of a nation’s president. She has legally deﬁned capacity-based authority to
make certain decisions, but her personal charisma – which could be conceived as
growing from her charismatic performances and from the trust citizens have invested
in her through their vote (Coleman 1963, Parsons 1963a) – extends her inﬂuence much
wider. On the other hand, the oﬃce of president and the national state have charisma,
created through the constant ritual practices that sanctify the state and nation, and that
oﬃce charisma is transmitted to the current president. Thus accumulated, charisma
does not entirely fade away even when the president’s term has ended, which is one
reason why former political leaders are often hired as ﬁgureheads of organizations
whose inﬂuence is entirely based on the publicity and goodwill they attract.
How much an actor’s ability to inﬂuence others depends on their ability to utilize
charisma, varies considerably. I suggest that the amount of charisma associated with an
actor – a person or an organization – depends on how widely known they are, how
trusted and respected they are, and how committed their fans or followers are. Through
the publicity that they can draw to an issue, charismatic actors such as celebrities may
also create public outrage that calls the attention of politicians, who want to collect
political points by volunteering to act on the problem. In that sense celebrities mobilize
capacity-based authority. On the other hand, their ability to generate goodwill for a
cause, such as relieving suﬀering in a poverty-stricken country through private dona-
tions, works through charismatic and moral authority. The inﬂuence of NGOs specia-
lized in policy advocacy is typically built on the assumption that they represent the
voice and opinion of big masses, but in fact the publicity they gain precedes their public
support and serves as the means to gather masses behind their cause. Charisma is
therefore the starting point and key to their inﬂuence; consider Greenpeace, whose
charismatic inﬂuence is very much built on the hazardous stunts they have pulled in the
seas around the world.
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8. Amassing and institutionalizing authority
Although the theory of authority discussed here was not built to tackle hierarchical
relations, it works well not only to unpack the struggle and contest for inﬂuence but
also institutionalized power relations.9 The way diﬀerent types of authority are evoked
and employed in speciﬁc situations shows that they are entwined with each other.
Forms of authority are also accumulated into generalized epistemic capital attached to
actors, texts, and principles. They constitute the self-evidence of the social world that
actors’ attempts to advance their goals call into question knowingly or intuitively.
Consider a police patrol, the sight of which slows down traﬃc because the police
have capacity-based authority to punish motorists for speeding. Such powers are also
legitimated by the moral authority of law, enhanced with the state’s charismatic
authority, and by the police oﬃcer’s capacity-based authority, described in the regula-
tions that deﬁne the rights of the police and the citizens. To give a driver a ticket for
speeding presupposes that the police can prove the facts – the speed limit in the
location and the actual speed of the car – and in doing that they lean on their and
the speed radar’s ontological authority. If the case goes to court, all this will be debated:
whether the police stayed within their jurisdiction, and whether the testimonies and
speed radar measures are reliable proof that an oﬀence has taken place.
The ontological authority of a video recording that shows police brutality related to
the incident would no doubt change the situation. It could lead to demonstrations and
riots that challenge the state’s authority and monopoly of violence, perhaps creating the
opportunity for the rise of a charismatic leader. The perceived capacity-based and moral
authority of the masses and public opinion outraged by police brutality could lead to
resignations or dismissals, court cases against the police oﬃcers, and even to changes in
legislation.
This hypothetical example shows how diﬀerent types of authority discussed here are
entwined. That is partly because persons referred to as authorities on diﬀerent grounds
often know and mingle with one another. For instance, bureaucrats and experts
consulted in planning and decision-making have a role in the exercise of governmental
authority (Haas 1992b, Bislev et al. 2002, Carayannis et al. 2011, Cohen 2013). There
are also theories of conspiracies and power elites that prepare, agree on, and manage
political decisions hidden from the public eye.
On the other hand, diﬀerent types of authority are enmeshed in people’s minds
because, linguistically, the word authority is a polyseme: a word with diﬀerent but
related senses. In diﬀerent contexts, the meanings of authority could even be considered
as separate homonyms: words that have the same spelling but diﬀerent meanings. For
instance, to refer to an oﬃce as a state authority is quite diﬀerent from citing Max
Weber as an authority. Yet these meanings inform and color each other. That is why it
makes sense to talk about epistemic capital as the sum of all the grounds and means by
which authority is built. Epistemic capital is like money invested in diﬀerent assets such
as currencies, equities and property: diﬀerent sources of authority are part of an entity’s
total weight in people’s minds. And diﬀerent types of epistemic capital can also be
exchanged with each other. For instance, respect and credibility built on the fame of a
rock star can be exchanged with moral authority, which is evident in celebrities being
used as goodwill ambassadors.
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Furthermore, common theories of power and authority frame people’s understandings
of the relations of dominance in society. Hence, theories of the power elite (Mills 1956),
technocracy (Allen 1933, Jasanoﬀ 1990), and network governance (Castells 2011) inform
common conceptions, which means that actors aiming to aﬀect decision-making need to
pay attention to their public image. On the one hand, politicians may do their best to
show that the political process is transparent, avoiding the impression that they prepare
decisions in a small circle behind closed doors. On the other hand, many INGOs and
IGOs, although they have little sanctioning power over government policies, ‘act as if they
were authorized in the strongest possible terms’ (Boli and Thomas 1999: 37), creating the
image of themselves as oﬃcial representatives of stakeholder groups who play a key role
in governance (see also Alasuutari et al. 2016). Similarly, many organizations and think
tanks that are established to promote the interests of small stakeholder groups join forces
with several others into meta-organizations (Ahrne and Brunsson 2008) or advocacy
networks and coalitions (Stone 2001, 2002, 2004, 2008, Weible 2011) to make the claim
that they represent the demands of a powerful block.
Naturally, the bases for actors’ deference vary. Consider the frequencies with which
international organizations are referenced in policy debates in diﬀerent countries, which
indicates the diﬀerences in their authority proﬁles (Alasuutari 2016, p. 116–129). The
United Nations has a strong proﬁle as a moral authority, although through its knowledge
production it also plays a role as an ontological authority. As an expert organization, the
OECD’s inﬂuence leans on ontological authority, but as a reference group for member
countries it also serves as a moral authority. In contrast, through its task as an organization
that provides concrete economic assistance, the World Bank has a distinct proﬁle as a
capacity-based authority, although in its PR activity it obviously aims to be perceived as a
consultative and hence as an ontological authority. But in aiming to enhance their cred-
ibility organizations build their authority on diﬀerent grounds and cite other authoritative
sources and entities.
9. Discussion
Power and authority are a popular topic in social research, but it has been divided into
discrete ﬁelds: historical sociologists (e.g. Mann 1986, 1993, 2012a, 2012b) stress the
material sources of social power; scholars in science studies and international policy
analysis focus on the role of knowledge production and epistemic communities; and
cultural studies scholars focus on popular culture, celebrities and charisma; etc. The
framework introduced here attempts to integrate these approaches into a single theory.
Rather than starting from the assumption that power is a feature of a community with a
pecking order, this theory proposes that it is better to analyze the strategies by which
actors aim to inﬂuence others, and that acquiring or employing authority as epistemic
capital is one of the strategies with which this is done. In this instance, authority refers
to actors or principles that people recognize as worth taking into consideration when
deciding how to act. As exempliﬁed in the previous section, researchers studying a
speciﬁc case can organize their processing of evidence in the conceptual terms on oﬀer
here: how do actors construct and utilize capacity-based, ontological, moral, and
charismatic authority in their quest for domination and political inﬂuence? What are
their authority proﬁles like, and how do they account for the actors’ inﬂuence?
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This theory owes pluralism to Weber, but the discursive and relational view grants
authority in its diﬀerent guises a bigger role in people’s struggles for inﬂuence. By
rejecting the questionable conceptual distinction made between power and authority, by
recognizing ontological authority missed by Weber, and by relativizing capacity-based
authority as just one type among others, I propose to have introduced a schema that
better comprehends the use of authority in the social world. Since these ways of
building and utilizing authority are always intertwined, it is of course possible to
identify and name forms of authority in several ways, but I claim that these four are
the building blocks from which strategies of power develop.
In aiming to inﬂuence others’ choices and hence to aﬀect social change, actors may
of course only rely on purely logical arguments that convince others of the sensible
thing to do10; this is what Habermas (1984a, 1984b) means when he talks about
communication free from domination. However, in actual practice persuading others
always entails arguments and moves that employ people’s conceptions of and beliefs in
authorities.
Stressing that actors are struggling to inﬂuence others with various means, including
coercion by force, likens the theory of authority presented here to the realist paradigm in
international relations, which basically assumes a war of all against all (Donnelly 2008). The
question is, can we talk about legitimation of authority under such conditions? If there is no
established social order that links actors into a community, one could argue that there is
nothing other than violence as a strategy to aﬀect others. I stress, however, that we tend to
draw too sharp a line between separate communities or societies, each having an established
social order and list of values. In fact, national states are remarkably isomorphic, and even
in armed conﬂicts governments appeal to ethical rules such as the international ban on
chemical weapons. In that sense, we can talk about world society (Meyer et al. 1997).
Furthermore, it is simplifying to assume that a social hierarchy is settled for good in any
society or organization: even straightforward chains of command are constantly negotiated.
The way it is used here, authority denotes practically anything that actors use to
inﬂuence others. An authority can be, for instance, a powerful person or organization, a
belief, an account of reality, a principle, a text, or an object such as an atomic bomb.
Extending authority from persons to material objects brings us close to Latour’s (2005)
actor-network-theory and to other posthumanist theories, which blur the boundary
between human and nonhuman agents (see e.g. Schatzki et al. 2001, Barad 2003).
However, nonhumans do not change the social world without human interference: an
object can be considered an authority only if humans can make a move that constructs
it as something to take seriously – for instance if a rock can be constructed as a
potential weapon or if beliefs in a stone’s sacredness are utilized.
From this perspective, the social world can be described as composed of and constituted
by all the things that actors take into consideration when pursuing their projects.
Depending on how important all these elements of reality are considered – that is, how
much epistemic capital is attached to them, people avoid or ﬁght obstacles and enemies, or
try to bind others to pursue their projects. Thus, epistemic capital is a variable measure:
actors are assumed to have varying amounts of inﬂuence on the conduct of others.
The vocabulary proposed here can also be used to account for hierarchical, zero-sum
power games. People give consent to institutionalized chains of command, for instance
regarding state structures. Apart from such cases, however, it is not possible or useful to
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give generalized accounts of who has power or how power works, because actors
constantly struggle for position and inﬂuence, and the end results depend on the
strategic situation at hand.
Epistemic capital is relational, based on recognition by others, which means that
nobody can claim it for themselves or for an object one-sidedly. On the other hand, the
more often an actor or principle is alluded to as an authority, the more important they
become. Epistemic capital increases with use and diminishes with disuse.11
Because authority is relational, image management and branding are an inherent part
of power games. And in this struggle, actors employ diﬀerent imageries of the social world
and notions of power, for instance by strengthening the image of themselves as powerful.
In this sense, we could say that this aspect of power games is the opposite of conspiracy
theories: rather than hiding their use of power, actors portray themselves as powerful as
they can, because their recognition among others depends on others’ beliefs.12 This is, of
course, a well-known strategy for instance in warfare.13 But hiding the details of actual
decision-making from the public is certainly another common strategy, typical of democ-
racies that expect transparency of the political process.
Stressing that authority is based on beliefs and trust is timely, considering the develop-
ments that we have witnessed especially since the turn of the 21st century. From the late
20th century onward, globalization, coupled with the breakthrough of the Internet and
social media, has fundamentally changed the dynamics of civic engagement and policy-
making, leaving national states vulnerable to new kinds of strategy and populist actors, who
construct themselves as charismatic saviors. New information and communication tech-
nology has enabled new ways of aﬀecting political opinion formation, mobilization,
advocacy, lobbying and inﬂuencing (see e.g. Bennett and Segerberg 2012). It is easier to
try and win others’ hearts and minds, organize virtual mass movements and networks, and
construct credible, authoritative organizations feared and respected by decision-makers.
These strategies by which actors can accumulate epistemic capital can also be utilized for
populist leadership, in which truth is at the core of political contestation. The theory
presented in this paper provides the means by which to critically investigate authority in
the contemporary world.
Notes
1. In the community power debate, the ‘pluralists’ criticizing of the ruling-elite model (Dahl
1958, Polsby 1960) seemed to make a similar point by stressing that, as a starting point,
one should not presuppose an elite that dominates a community. They ended up saying
that there are several actors who aﬀect decision-making in diﬀerent issue areas. Yet the
focus was on studying who the dominant actors are; power was considered as hierarchical
feature of a community, even though it was questioned whether anyone at all runs a
community.
2. This relational and constitutive view of power has been criticized for castrating the concept
altogether; it has been argued that if power is everywhere, it is meaningless to talk about it,
or about freedom as distinct from power and domination (see e.g. Lukes 2005). I argue, on
the contrary, that presupposing a hierarchy of power dilutes the very essence of social
order, which entails constant struggle for the control of and inﬂuence on others’ behavior
through working on their understandings of the situation at hand. Thus, there is constant
strife of authorities (De Jouvenel 1993, p. 130, Coleman 1997) and tension between
authoritative views.
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3. This view has been criticized as a trap ‘where all social relationships are seen in the same
relativistic light and where all – dominated and dominant alike – are subject to the same
power of structural relations and so all subject to the same moral opprobrium’ (Dowding
2006, p. 136).
4. In fact, the very point that an increasing number of non-proﬁts want to call themselves
NGOs rather than, say, charities or churches, is due to a recent global fashion that
cherishes organization, which is why there has been a global explosion in the number of
non-proﬁts (Meyer and Bromley 2013). For instance, Zeynep Atalay (2016) shows how,
over the last two decades, informal Islamic networks have been re-establishing themselves
as formal NGOs and building transnational coalitions, adopting and vernacularizing the
liberal civil society discourse as a strategy by which they become considered as legitimate
representatives of and spokespersons for the Islamic world. On the other hand, in some
cases actors want to be seen as spontaneous grassroots movements, distancing themselves
from formal, bureaucratic parties or organizations. For example Schnable (2016) shows
that a considerable share of American-based INGOs are small and run by amateurs and
that they also want to retain an image of being anti-professional: as organizations whose
fundraising is based on individual donors who prefer a direct link with recipients rather
than a long ‘aid chain’.
5. In her historical study of great power wars over the last 150 years, Ann Hironaka (2016)
shows how, again and again, military scholars have analyzed the reasons for the victorious
military, and competing military powers have then drawn lessons from the winners.
According to Hironaka’s study, the irony is that war technology changes quickly, and
that the conclusions of wars are dependent on a number of contingent events.
6. For instance, Perelman (1984, 1968) stresses that a legal system must not be conceived as
analogous to a mathematical or a logical system, because law cannot operate in isolation
from public opinion, which changes over time. As he puts it, ‘concerns of an ideological,
moral, religious or political order can never be extraneous to the law, for they exercise a
deep inﬂuence on the eﬀectiveness of the system and on the manner in which rules of law
are interpreted and applied’ (Perelman 1984).
7. By applying Weber’s deﬁnition, Kurzman et al. (2007) treat celebrities as a new kind of
status group, but seem to imply that celebrity should not be seen as a type or subcategory
of charismatic domination (see also Reed 2013, p. 256).
8. Accordingly, touching a charismatic person is considered as an extraordinary experience.
For instance, a U.S. state representative was eager to talk about the moment Barack Obama
held her hand for several moments. ‘He is just electric, absolutely electric, and the kind of
person you want to stand next to,’ she said excitedly (Alexander 2010: 330).
9. In fact, it works better than, say, Weber’s famous three-pronged categorization, according
to which the claims to the legitimacy of authority may be based on rational, traditional,
and charismatic grounds (Weber 1978, p. 215).Weber’s typology does capture the kind of
argumentation lawyers and state employees use constantly: they refer to laws and regula-
tions. However, it takes the law for granted in that it does not recognize the rationales –
common beliefs in moral principles – behind considering law as a justiﬁcation. However, it
rules out someone’s capacity to act, for instance to use force, as grounds for their
authority. Besides, it does not recognize constructions of truth as a source of authority.
10. This is how Perelman (1982) deﬁnes the realm of rhetoric: it includes all other means to
convince others than pure logic.
11. This is also how Putnam et al. (1993, p. 170) describe the social capital of communities.
12. I thank Risto Heiskala for this observation.
13. This phenomenon is also common in the animal world, in which many creatures defend
themselves by pretending to be bigger or otherwise more dangerous than they are.
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